The sensitivity of U.S. aggregate investment to shocks is procyclical: the response upon impact increases by approximately 50% from the trough to the peak of the business cycle.
Introduction
U.S. nonresidential private fixed investment exhibits conditional heteroscedasticity. Figure 1 depicts a smooth, nonparametric, normalized estimate of the heteroscedasticity of the residual from fitting an AR process to quarterly aggregate investment rates from 1960 to 2005, as a function of the average recent investment rate (see Appendix B for details). This figure shows that investment is significantly more responsive to shocks in times of high investment. Lagged avge. I/K
Conditional Heteroscedasticity
In this paper we show that this nonlinear feature of the data follows naturally from a DSGE model with lumpy microeconomic investment. The reason for conditional heteroscedasticity in the model, is that the impulse response function is history dependent, with an initial response that increases by approximately 50% from the bottom to the peak of the business cycle. In particular, the longer an expansion, the larger the response of investment to further shocks.
Conversely, recovering from investment slumps is hard.
More broadly, our calibrated model suggests that over the 1960-2005 period the average initial response of investment to a productivity shock in the top quartile is 32% higher than the average response in the bottom quartile. The left and center panels in Figure 2 depict the response over five quarters to a one standard deviation shock taking place at selected points of the U.S. investment cycle, for an ARCH-type time series model and our calibrated lumpy investment model, respectively. 2 The periods considered are the trough in 1961, a period of average investment activity in 1989 and the peak in 2000. The variability of these impulse responses is large and similar in the left and center panels. For example, the immediate response to a shock in the trough in 1961 and the peak in 2000 differ by roughly 50%. The contrast with the 1 The dotted lines depict one-standard error bands. 2 See Appendix B for details on the time series model. Beyond explaining the rich nonlinear dynamics of aggregate investment rates, our model provides a counterexample to the claim that microeconomic investment lumpiness is inconsequential for macroeconomic analysis. This is relevant, since even though Caballero and Engel (1999) found substantial aggregate nonlinearities in a partial equilibrium model with lumpy capital adjustment, recent and important methodological contributions by Veracierto (2002) , Thomas (2002) and Thomas (2003, 2008) have provided examples where general equilibrium undoes the partial equilibrium features.
Why do we reach a different conclusion? Because, implicitly, earlier calibrations imposed that the bulk of investment dynamics was determined by general equilibrium constraints rather than by adjustment costs. Instead, we focus our calibration effort on gauging the relative importance of these forces, and conclude that both adjustment costs and general equilibrium forces play a relevant role.
Our calibration begins by noting that the objective in any dynamic macroeconomic model is to trace the impact of aggregate shocks on aggregate endogenous variables (investment in our context). The typical response is less than one-for-one upon impact, as a variety of microeconomic frictions and general equilibrium constraints attenuate and spread over time the response of the endogenous variable. We refer to this process as smoothing, and decompose it into its partial equilibrium (PE) and general equilibrium (GE) components. In the context 3 The figures in the three panels are normalized so that the impulse response in 1989:I is one upon impact.
of nonlinear lumpy-adjustment models, PE-smoothing does not refer to the existence of microeconomic inaction and lumpiness per se, but to their impact in smoothing the response of aggregates. This is a key distinction in this class of models, as in many instances microeconomic inaction translates into limited aggregate inertia (recall the classic Caplin and Spulber (1987) result, where price-setters follow Ss rules but the aggregate price level behaves as if there were no microeconomic frictions). In a nutshell, our key difference with the previous literature is that the latter explored combinations of parameter values that implied microeconomic lumpiness but left almost no role for PE-smoothing, thereby precluding the possibility of fitting facts such as the conditional heteroscedasticity of aggregate investment rates depicted in Figures 1 and 2. PE and GE smoothing (0.0023) 100% Table 1 illustrates our model's decomposition into PE-and GE-smoothing. The lower entry shows quarterly volatility of aggregate investment rates in our model with adjustment costs and price responses. The upper entry reports this statistic when neither smoothing mechanism is present, that is, when adjustment costs are set to zero and prices to their average value in our model with both sources of smoothing. The intermediate entries consider only one source of smoothing at a time, for example, "only PE-smoothing" retains adjustment costs but sets prices at their average values in the economy that leads to the lower entry. The reduction of the quarterly standard deviation of the aggregate investment rate achieved by PE-smoothing alone amounts to 81.0% of the reduction achieved by the combination of both smoothing mechanisms. Alternatively, the additional smoothing achieved by PE-forces, compared with what GEsmoothing achieves by itself, is 15.4% of the total.
It is clear from Table 1 that both sources of smoothing do not enter additively, so some care is needed when quantifying their relative importance. Nonetheless, averaging the upper and lower bounds mentioned above suggests roughly similar roles for both. By contrast, as discussed in detail in Section 3, the contribution of PE-smoothing is very small in the recent literature-typically the upper bound is under 20% while the lower bound is zero.
Our calibration strategy is designed to capture the role of PE-smoothing as directly as possible. To this effect, we use sectoral data to calibrate the parameters that control the impact of micro-frictions on aggregates, before general equilibrium forces have a chance to play a significant smoothing role. Specifically, we argue that the response of semi-aggregated (e.g., 3-digit) investment to corresponding sectoral shocks is less subject to general equilibrium forces, and hence serves to identify the relative importance of PE-smoothing. The first row in Table 2 shows the observed volatility of annual sectoral and aggregate investment rates, and their ratio. 4 The second and third rows show these values for our baseline lumpy model and the model with no microeconomic frictions in investment, respectively. The fourth row reports these statistics for the model in Khan and Thomas (2008) . 5 It is apparent from this table that the frictionless model fails to match the sectoral data (it was never designed to do so). In contrast, by reallocating smoothing from GE-to PE-forces, the lumpy investment model is able to match both aggregate and sectoral volatility. This pins down our decomposition and is, together with the conditional-heteroscedasticity feature, the essence of our calibration strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 3 discusses the calibration method in detail. Sections 4 presents the main macroeconomic implications of the model. Section 5 concludes and is followed by several appendices. 4 Sectoral investment data are only available at an annual frequency. The numbers in rows two and three come from the annual analogues of our quarterly baseline models. For details, see Appendices A.2 and A.3. 5 The lumpy model in Kahn and Thomas (2008) exhibits larger sectoral volatility than the frictionless counterpart of our lumpy model because of differences in the curvature of the revenue function (see Section 3.1 for details). The volatility of aggregate investment rates in the Kahn-Thomas (2008) entry of Table 2 is taken from table III in their paper. The volatility of sectoral investment rates is based on our calculations.
The Model
In this section we describe our model economy. We start with the problem of the production units, followed by a brief description of the households and the definition of equilibrium. We conclude with a sketch of the equilibrium computation. We follow closely Kahn and Thomas (2008), henceforth KT, both in terms of substance and notation. Aside from parameter differences, we have three main departures from KT. First, production units face persistent sectorspecific productivity shocks, in addition to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Second, production units undertake some within-period maintenance investment which is necessary to continue operation (some parts and machines that break down need to be replaced, see, e.g.,
McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) and Letterie, Pfann and Verick (2004) for evidence on the importance of maintenance and replacement investment). Third, the distribution of aggregate productivity shocks is continuous rather than a Markov discretization, which allows us to back out the aggregate shocks that are fed into the model to produce Figures 2 and 3.
Production Units
The economy consists of a large number of sectors, which are each populated by a continuum of production units. Since we do not model entry and exit decisions, the mass of these continua is fixed and normalized to one. There is one commodity in the economy that can be consumed or invested. Each production unit produces this commodity, employing its pre-determined capital stock (k) and labor (n), according to the following Cobb-Douglas decreasing-returnsto-scale production function (θ > 0, ν > 0, θ + ν < 1):
where z, S and I denote aggregate, sectoral and unit-specific (idiosyncratic) productivity shocks.
We denote the trend growth rate of aggregate productivity by (1 − θ)(γ − 1), so that y and k grow at rate γ−1 along the balanced growth path. From now on we work with k and y (and later C ) in efficiency units. The detrended aggregate productivity level, which we also denote by z, evolves according to an AR(1) process in logs, with normal innovations v with zero mean and
The sectoral and idiosyncratic technology processes follow Markov chains, that are approximations to continuous AR(1) processes with Gaussian innovations. 6 The latter have standard 6 We use the discretization in Tauchen (1986) , see Appendix C for details.
deviations σ S and σ I , and autocorrelations ρ S and ρ I , respectively. Productivity innovations at different aggregation levels are independent. Also, sectoral productivity shocks are independent across sectors and idiosyncratic productivity shocks are independent across productive units.
Each period a production unit draws from a time invariant distribution, G, its current cost of capital adjustment, ξ ≥ 0, which is denominated in units of labor. G is a uniform distribution on [0,ξ], common to all units. Draws are independent across units and over time, and employment is freely adjustable.
At the beginning of a period, a production unit is characterized by its pre-determined capital stock, the sector it belongs to and the corresponding sectoral productivity level, its idiosyncratic productivity, and its capital adjustment cost. Given the aggregate state, it decides its employment level, n, production occurs, workers are paid, and investment decisions are made. Upon investment the unit incurs a fixed cost of ωξ, where ω is the current real wage rate. Capital depreciates at a rate δ and a fraction of depreciated capital is replaced to continue operation.
Then the period ends.
We also introduce replacement and maintenance investment as an essential feature of actual production units. This is justified when each productive unit can be viewed as a composite of core and peripheral components, where core components need to be replaced immediately for the unit to continue production. Alternatively, maintaining certain components of a productive unit on a regular basis so that they do not depreciate at all, can be considerably more cost effective than using a stop-go approach to maintenance. 7 We defineψ ≡ γ 1−δ > 1 as the investment rate needed to fully compensate depreciation and trend growth. The degree of necessary maintenance or replacement, χ, can then be conveniently defined as a fraction ofψ. If χ = 0, no maintenance investment is needed; if χ = 1, all depreciation and trend growth must be replaced for a production unit to continue operation.
We can now summarize the evolution of the unit's capital stock (in efficiency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k , after non-maintenance investment i and maintenance
Fixed cost paid γk
We treat χ as a primitive parameter. 8 7 For instance, maintaining the roof of a structure on a regular basis is likely to dominate over the alternative of repairing it only when it begins to leak. 8 We note that our version of maintenance investment differs from what KT call "constrained investment". Here, As we will discuss in Section 4, replacement and maintenance investment play an important role in shaping aggregate investment dynamics, since it determines the effective (i.e., after maintenance) depreciation rate. This differs from what happens with linear investment models, where the depreciation rate plays a minor role. We have introduced these determinants of investment in an admittedly stylized manner with a single structural parameter, and leave for future research a more detailed study of these issues.
Given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, it is sufficient to describe differences across production units and their evolution by the distribution of units over ( S , I , k). We denote this distribution by µ. Thus, (z, µ) constitutes the current aggregate state and µ evolves according to the law of motion µ = Γ(z, µ), which production units take as given.
Next we describe the dynamic programming problem of each production unit. We take two shortcuts (details can be found in KT). First, we state the problem in terms of utils of the representative household (rather than physical units), and denote by p = p(z, µ) the marginal utility of consumption. This is the relative intertemporal price faced by a production unit. Second, given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, continuation values can be expressed without explicitly taking into account future adjustment costs.
It will simplify notation to define an additional parameter, ψ ∈ [1,ψ]:
and write maintenance investment as:
Let V 1 ( S , I , k, ξ; z, µ) denote the expected discounted value-in utils-of a unit that is in idiosyncratic state ( I , k, ξ), and is in a sector with sectoral productivity S , given the aggregate state (z, µ). Then the expected value prior to the realization of the adjustment cost draw is given by:
With this notation the dynamic programming problem is given by:
maintenance refers to the replacement of parts and machines without which production cannot continue, while in KT it is an extra margin of adjustment for small investment projects. 9 Note that if ψ = 1, then i M = 0, and if ψ =ψ, 
where both expectation operators average over next period's realizations of the aggregate, sectoral and idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on this period's values, and we recall that
Also, β denotes the discount factor from the representative household.
Taking as given intra-and intertemporal prices ω(z, µ) and p(z, µ), and the law of motion µ = Γ(z, µ), the production unit chooses optimally labor demand, whether to adjust its capital stock at the end of the period, and the optimal capital stock, conditional on adjustment. This leads to policy functions:
Since capital is predetermined, the optimal employment decision is independent of the current adjustment cost draw.
Households
We assume a continuum of identical households that have access to a complete set of statecontingent claims. Hence, there is no heterogeneity across households. Moreover, they own shares in the production units and are paid dividends. We do not need to model the household side explicitly (see KT for details), and concentrate instead on the first-order conditions to determine the equilibrium wage and the intertemporal price.
Households have a standard felicity function in consumption and (indivisible) labor:
where C denotes consumption and N h the fraction of household members that work. Households maximize the expected present discounted value of the above felicity function. By definition we have:
and from the intratemporal first-order condition:
Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of functions 
Household optimality:
Taking ω and p as given, the household's consumption and labor supply satisfy (8) and (9).
3. Commodity market clearing:
Labor market clearing:
where J (x) = 0, if x = 0 and 1, otherwise.
Model consistent dynamics:
The evolution of the cross-section that characterizes the econ-
, k, ξ; z, µ) and the exogenous processes for z, S and I .
Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 define an equilibrium given Γ, while step 5 specifies the equilibrium condition for Γ.
Solution
As is well-known, (6) is not computable, since µ is infinite dimensional. Hence, we follow Smith (1997, 1998) and approximate the distribution µ by its first moment over capital, and its evolution, Γ, by a simple log-linear rule. In the same vein, we approximate the equilibrium pricing function by a log-linear rule:
wherek denotes aggregate capital holdings. Given (10), we do not have to specify an equilibrium rule for the real wage. As usual with this procedure, we posit this form and verify that in equilibrium it yields a good fit to the actual law of motion (see Appendix C for details).
To implement the computation of sectoral investment rates, we simplify the problem further and impose two additional assumptions: 1) ρ S = ρ I = ρ and 2) enough sectors, so that sectoral shocks have no aggregate effects. Combining both assumptions reduces the state space in the production unit's problem further to a combined technology level ≡ S I . Now, log follows an AR(1) with first-order autocorrelation ρ and Gaussian innovations N (0, σ 2 ), with
Since the sectoral technology level has no aggregate consequences by assumption, the production unit cannot use it to extract any more information about the future than it has already from the combined technology level. Finally, it is this combined productivity level that is discretized into a 19-state Markov chain. The second assumption allows us to compute the sectoral problem independently of the aggregate general equilibrium problem. 10 Combining these assumptions and substitutingk for µ into (6) and using (11a)-(11b), we have that (7a)-(7d) become
With the above expressions, (6) becomes a computable dynamic programming problem with
We solve this problem via value function iteration on V 0 and Gauss-Hermitian numerical integration over log(z) (see Appendix C for details).
Several features facilitate the solution of the model. First, as mentioned above, the employment decision is static. In particular it is independent of the investment decision at the end of the period. Hence we can use the production unit's first-order condition to maximize out the 10 In Appendix C.3 we show that our results are robust to this simplifying assumption. optimal employment level:
Next we comment on the computation of the production unit's decision rules and value function, given the equilibrium pricing and movement rules (11a)-(11b). From (12d) it is obvious that neither V a nor the optimal target capital level, conditional on adjustment, depend on current capital holdings. This reduces the number of optimization problems in the value function iteration considerably. Comparing (12d) with (12b) shows that V a ( ; z,k) ≥ V i ( , k; z,k).
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It follows that there exists an adjustment cost factor that makes a production unit indifferent between adjusting and not adjusting:
We define ξ
We define mandated investment for a unit with current state ( , z,k) and current capital k as:
That is, mandated investment is the investment rate the unit would undertake, after maintaining its capital, if its current adjustment cost draw were equal to zero. Now we turn to the second step of the computational procedure that takes the value function V 0 ( , k; z,k) as given, and pre-specifies a randomly drawn sequence of aggregate technology levels: {z t }. We start from an arbitrary distribution µ 0 , implying a valuek 0 . We then recompute (6), using (12a)-(12d), at every point along the sequence {z t }, and the implied sequence of aggregate capital levels {k t }, without imposing the equilibrium pricing rule (11a):
with V i defined in (7b) and evaluated atk =k (k t ). This yields new "policy functions"
We then search for a p such that, given these new decision rules and after aggregation, the goods market clears (labor market clearing is trivially satisfied show in Appendix C that the implied R 2 of these regressions are high for all model specifications, generally well above 0.99, indicating that production units do not make large mistakes by using the rules (11a)-(11b). This is confirmed by the fact that adding higher moments of the capital distribution does not increase forecasting performance significantly.
Calibration
Our calibration strategy and parameters are standard with two additional features: We combine sectoral and aggregate data in order to infer the relative importance of PE-and GE-smoothing, and we calibrate the maintenance parameter by matching the conditional heteroscedasticity of investment in U.S. data.
Calibration Strategy
The model period is a quarter. The following parameters have standard values: β = 0.9942, γ = 0.004, ν = 0.64, and ρ A = 0.95. The depreciation rate δ matches the average quarterly investment rate in the data, 0.026, which leads to δ = 0.022. The disutility of work parameter, A, is chosen to generate an employment rate of 0.6.
Next we explain our choices for θ and the parameters of the sectoral and idiosyncratic technology process (ρ S , σ S , ρ I and σ I ). The output elasticity of capital, θ, is set to 0.18, in order to capture a revenue elasticity of capital,
, equal to 0.5, while keeping the labor share at its 0.64-value. 12 We determine σ S and ρ S by a standard Solow residual calculation on annual 3- 12 In a world with constant returns to scale and imperfect competition this amounts to a markup of approximately 22%. 13 For computational convenience we set ρ I = ρ S , and σ I to 0.0472, which leads to an annual standard deviation of the sum of sectoral and idiosyncratic shocks equal to 0.10. 14 We turn now to the calibration of the two key parameters of the model, the adjustment cost parameter,ξ, and the maintenance parameter, χ. We also describe how we calibrate the volatility of aggregate productivity shocks, σ A .
With the availability of new and more detailed establishment level data, researchers have calibrated adjustment costs by matching establishment level moments (see, e.g., KT). This is a promising strategy in many instances, however, there are two sources of concern in the context of this paper's objectives. First, one must take a stance regarding the number of productive units in the model that correspond to one productive unit in the available micro data. Some authors assume that this correspondence is one-to-one, while others match a large number of model-micro-units to one observed productive unit. 15 Second, in state dependent models the frequency of microeconomic adjustment is not sufficient to pin down the object of primary concern, which is the aggregate impact of adjust- Because of these concerns, we follow an alternative approach where we use 3-digit sectoral rather than plant level data to calibrate adjustment costs. More precisely, given a value of χ, we chooseξ to match the volatility of sectoral U.S. investment rates. Having done this, we choose σ A to match the volatility of the aggregate U.S. investment rate. This leads to σ A = 0.0080. 16 The novelty in our calibration strategy is that it focuses on matching the relative importance of PE 13 See Appendix A.3 for details and Appendix B.4 for robustness checks. 14 In Table 16 in Appendix B.4 we consider values of 0.075 and 0.15 for the annual total standard deviation, with no significant changes to our baseline calibration. 15 See Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and KT for an example of the former, and Abel and Eberly (2002) and Bloom (2009), who respectively assume that a continuum and 250 model micro units correspond to one observed plant or firm, for examples of the latter. 16 For the frictionless model we also choose σ A to match aggregate investment volatility, which leads to σ A = 0.0051.
and GE smoothing directly. This approach assumes that the sectors we consider are sufficiently disaggregated so that general equilibrium effects can be ignored while, at the same time, there are enough micro units in them to justify the computational simplifications that can be made with a large number of units. Hence the choice of the 3-digit level. 17 Given a set of parameters, the sequence of sectoral investment rates is generated as follows:
First, the units' optimal policies are determined as described in Section 2.4, working in general equilibrium. Next, starting at the steady state, the economy is subjected to a sequence of sectoral shocks. Since sectoral shocks are assumed to have no aggregate effects and ρ I = ρ S , productive units perceive them as part of their idiosyncratic shock and use their optimal policies with a value of one for the aggregate shock and a value equal to the product of the sectoral and idiosyncratic shock-i.e. log( ) = log( S ) + log( I )-for the idiosyncratic shock. 18 The value of sectoral volatility of annual investment rates we match is 0.0163. To obtain this number we compute the volatilities of the linearly detrended 3-digit sectoral investment rates and take a weighted average. As noted in the introduction, this number is one order of magnitude smaller than the one predicted by the frictionless model. To match this annual sectoral volatility in the model simulations, we aggregate over time the quarterly investment rates generated by the model.
As shown in Figure 1 , the residuals from estimating an autoregressive process for aggregate U.S. investment exhibit time-varying heteroscedasticity. Appendix B finds evidence of heteroscedasticity, and therefore of time-varying impulse responses, for overall U.S. investment and for equipment and structures separately, using two families of ARCH-type models. 19 We calibrate the maintenance parameter χ by matching the logarithm of the ratio between the 95th and the 5th percentile of the estimated values for the conditional heteroscedasticity over the 1960-2005 period in the simple ARCH model described below; we refer to this statistic as the heteroscedasticity range in what follows.
Concretely, given a quarterly series of aggregate investment-to-capital ratios, x t , the moment we match is obtained -both for actual and model-simulated data-by first regressing the series on its lagged value and then regressing the squared residual from this regression,ê regression, the heteroscedasticity range is equal to log(σ 95 /σ 5 ). The target value for the heteroscedasticity range in the data is 0.3021.
Calibration Results
The upper bound of the adjustment cost distribution,ξ, and the maintenance parameter, χ, that jointly match the sectoral investment volatility and the conditional heteroscedasticity statistic areξ = 8.8 and χ = 0.50, respectively. 20 The average cost actually paid is much lower than the average adjustment cost,ξ/2, as shown in Table 3 , since productive units wait for good draws to
adjust. The third row shows that, conditional on adjusting, in our calibrated model a production unit pays 3.6% of its annual output (column 1) or, equivalently, 5.6% of its regular wage bill (column 2). 21 These costs are at the lower end of previous estimates, as shown by comparing them with rows 4 through 6. The first two rows of Table 2 in the introduction and Table 4 below show that our model fits both the sectoral and aggregate volatility of investment, as well as the range of conditional heteroscedasticity in aggregate data. This is not surprising, since our calibration strategy is designed to match these moments. In contrast, the bottom two rows in each of these tables show that neither the frictionless counterpart of our model nor the KT model match these features.
22 20 The values of χ we consider are multiples of 0.10, while the grid forξ is finer. 21 To compare our findings with the annual adjustment cost estimates in the literature, we report these numbers for an annual analogue of the quarterly model. 22 See footnote 5 for an explanation of why KT exhibits slightly lower nonlinearity than our calibration of a frictionless model. The first two rows in Table 3 report the magnitude of adjustment costs for χ = 0 and χ = 0.25.
When calibrating these models, we no longer match the heteroscedasticity range in the data, but continue to match both sectoral and aggregate investment volatilities. For χ = 0.25, the magnitude of adjustment costs lies slightly below the average of those estimated in the literature, for χ = 0 they are slightly above the maximum value, but still within the ballpark.
The second and third rows in Table 4 show the range of heteroscedasticity values for versions of our model with values of χ smaller than in the benchmark case; the first row shows the values obtained directly from the data using our ARCH model. Even though these ranges now are smaller than those in the data, they continue being significantly larger than those implied by a frictionless model. The model with χ = 0 has a heteroscedasticity range three times as large as in the frictionless model, for the model with χ = 25% it is four times as large. The latter is much closer to the value in the data than in the frictionless model.
Ultimately, the main difference between our calibration and KT is the size of the adjustment cost. lower bounds for the contribution of PE-smoothing are calculated as follows:
where σ denotes the standard deviation of aggregate investment rates, NONE refers to the partial equilibrium model with no microeconomic frictions, PE to the model that only has microeconomic frictions so that prices are fixed at their average levels of the GE specification, GE to the model with endogenous price movements governed by the first-order conditions of the representative household (10) , and BOTH to the model with both micro frictions and GE constraints. The main message can be gathered from the first two rows of these tables: By changing the adjustment cost distribution in KT's model for ours, 24 its ability to generate substantial PEsmoothing rises significantly. Conversely, introducing KT adjustment costs into an annual version of our lumpy model with zero maintenance (third row) leads to a similarly small role of PE-smoothing as in their model. Rows four to nine show the much larger role for PE-smoothing under our calibration strategy, robustly for annual and quarterly calibrations and low and high values of the maintenance parameter. 24 Since KT measure labor in time units (and therefore calibrate to a steady state value of 0.3), and we measure labor in employment units, the steady state value of which is 0.6, and adjustment costs in both cases are measured in labor units, we actually use half of our calibrated adjustment cost parameter. Conversely, when we insert KT adjustment costs into our model, we double it.
Conventional RBC Moments
Before turning to the specific aggregate implications and mechanisms of microeconomic lumpiness that are behind the empirical success of our model, we show that these gains do not come at the cost of sacrificing conventional RBC-moment-matching. Tables 6 and 7 report standard longitudinal second moments for both the lumpy model and its frictionless counterpart. We also include a model with no idiosyncratic shocks and the higher revenue elasticity of KT (we label it RBC). As with all models, the volatility of aggregate productivity shocks is chosen to match the volatility of the aggregate investment rate. Overall, the second moments of the lumpy model are reasonable and comparable to those of the frictionless models. While the former exacerbates the inability of RBC models to match the volatility of employment (we use data from the establishment survey on total employment from the BLS), the lumpy model improves significantly when matching the volatility of consumption. 26 The lumpy model also increases slightly the persistence of most aggregate variables, bringing these statistics closer to their values in the data. 25 The value of σ A required for the RBC model is 0.0058. For the lumpy model, the employment statistics are computed from total employment, that is including those workers who work on adjusting the capital stock. We work with all variables in logs and detrend then with an HP-filter using a bandwidth of 1600.
26 Consistent with our model, we define aggregate consumption as consumption of nondurables and service minus housing services. Also, we define output as the sum of this consumption aggregate and aggregate investment.
Aggregate Investment Dynamics
In this section we describe the mechanism behind our model's ability to match the conditional heteroscedasticity of aggregate investment rates. In particular, we show that lumpy adjustment models generate history dependent aggregate impulse responses. Following Caballero and Engel (1993b), the responsiveness index at time t is defined as follows: Given an economy characterized by a joint distribution of capital and productivity µ t , and an aggregate productivity level z t , we denote the resulting aggregate investment rate by I K (µ t , log z t ) and define the normalized response of this economy to a positive and negative one standard deviation aggregate productivity shock, respectively, as
where σ A is the standard deviation of the aggregate innovation. The Responsiveness Index at time t then is defined as:
That is, this index captures the response upon impact of the aggregate investment rate to an aggregate productivity innovation, conditional on the current state of the economy.
The shocks fed into the model are the ones backed out to match actual aggregate quarterly investment rates over the sample period. We initialize the process with the economy at its steady state in the fourth quarter of 1959.
27
The figure confirms the statement in the introduction, according to which in the lumpy capital adjustment model the initial response to an aggregate shock varies significantly more over time than in a frictionless model: The responsiveness index grows by 50.9% between trough and peak, which is similar to the 46.8% variation obtained from the simple ARCH-type model discussed in Section 3.1 and considerably larger than the 11.6% variation implied by the frictionless model.
To understand how lumpy adjustment models generate time varying impulse responses, two features of the time paths of the responsiveness index are important. Note first that the index fluctuates much less in the frictionless economy than in the lumpy economy. Recall also that the frictionless economy only has general equilibrium forces to move this index around.
From these two observations we can conjecture that the contribution of the general equilibrium forces to the volatility of the index in the lumpy economy is minor.
It follows from this figure that it is the decline in the strength of the PE-smoothing mechanism that is responsible for the rise in the index during the boom phase. When this mechanism is weakened, the responsiveness index in the lumpy economy grows by more than that of the frictionless economy in a boom. . 28 It is apparent from this figure that during the boom the cross-section of 27 By "steady state" we mean the ergodic (time-average) distribution, which we calculate as follows: starting from an arbitrary capital distribution and the ergodic distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks, we simulate the development of an economy with no aggregate innovations for 300 periods, but using the policy functions under the assumption of an economy subject to aggregate shocks. The convex curves in Figure 4 depict the state-dependent adjustment hazard; that is, the probability of adjusting conditional on mandated investment. It is clear that the probability of adjusting increases with the (absolute) value of mandated investment. This is the 'increasing hazard property' described in Caballero and Engel (1993a) . The convexity of the estimated state-dependent adjustment hazards implies that the probability that a shock induces a micro unit to adjust is larger for units with larger values of mandated investment. Since units move into the region with a higher slope of the adjustment hazard during the boom, aggregate investment becomes more responsive. This effect is further compounded by the fact that the adjustment hazard shifts upward as the boom proceeds, although this mechanism is small. In summary, the decline in the strength of PE-smoothing during the boom (and hence the larger response to shocks) results mainly from the rise in the share of agents that adjust to further shocks. This is in contrast with the frictionless (and Calvo style) models where the only margin of adjustment is the average size of these adjustments. This is shown in Figure 5 , which decomposes the time path of the responsiveness index of the lumpy model into two components: one that reflects the response of the fraction of adjusters (the extensive margin) and another that captures the response of average adjustments of those who adjust (the intensive margin). It is apparent that most of the change in the responsiveness index is accounted for by We end this section by analyzing the role of the maintenance parameter in determining aggregate investment dynamics. As discussed in Section 3.2, the magnitude of adjustment costs decreases with χ, while the extent to which the investment response varies over the cycle increases with χ. The insights we have gained earlier in this section provide an explanation for these findings.
The negative correlation between adjustment costs and maintenance follows from the fact that a higher maintenance parameter lowers the effective drift of mandated investment, defined as depreciation that is not necessarily undone in a given period. Without maintenance, the drift dominates over microeconomic uncertainty shocks and the cross section of mandated investment is closer to the Caplin and Spulber extreme where there is no PE-smoothing (see Caballero and Engel, 2007) . Figure 8 shows the average cross-section distribution of mandated investment for our baseline model and for the model with χ = 0. The former is clearly farther aggregate investment is mainly driven by investment spikes and those to a large degree are accounted for by the fraction of units undergoing major investment episodes.
away from the Caplin-Spulber uniform limit, leaving more space for PE-smoothing. Thus, in order to keep PE-smoothing constant as we reduce the value of the maintenance parameters, we need to compensate it by increasing the adjustment cost. Note, however, that the compensation via an increase in adjustment costs is not enough to preserve the volatility of the impulse response as we drop maintenance (see Table 4 ), since this feature is more sensitive to the shape of the cross section distribution. However, Figure 9 shows that even with zero maintenance, the responsiveness index of the lumpy economy varies considerably more than in the frictionless economy. 
Final Remarks
This paper begins by presenting time series evidence showing that the impulse response function for U.S. investment is history dependent: investment responds more to a given shock during persistent booms than during slumps.
Next we argue that it is important to identify the relative contribution of partial and general equilibrium forces in smoothing the impact of shocks on aggregate variables. In particular, in the case of investment models with lumpy capital adjustment we find that only models that allow a non-trivial role for partial equilibrium smoothing can match the time series evidence on history dependent impulse responses.
Finally, we show that the reason why models that add realistic lumpy capital adjustment to an otherwise standard RBC model generate procyclical impulse responses is that, relative to the standard RBC model, in the lumpy models investment booms feed into themselves and lead to significantly larger capital accumulation following a string of positive shocks. During busts, on the other hand, the economy is largely unresponsive to positive shocks. These are exactly the patterns we observe in U.S. aggregate data.
A Parameter and Data Appendix
A.1 Parameters Table 8 summarizes the common parameters of the models explored in the paper: The calibration of the other parameters, σ A , χ,ξ and A is explained in Section 3. When we refer in the main text to a quarterly calibration (our benchmark models), then we use -given the quarterly parameters in the table above -σ A andξ to match jointly the standard deviation of the quarterly aggregate investment rate and the standard deviation of the yearly sectoral investment rate, which is aggregated up over four quarters in the sectoral simulations (we do not have quarterly sectoral data). This amounts to σ A = 0.0080 for the baseline lumpy model and σ A = 0.0051 for its frictionless counterpart. When we refer to a yearly calibration, then we use -given the yearly parameters in the table above -σ A andξ to match jointly the standard deviation of the yearly aggregate investment rate nd the standard deviation of the yearly sectoral investment rate. This amounts to σ A = 0.0186 for the baseline lumpy model and σ A = 0.0120 for its frictionless counterpart. The parameter that governs conditional heteroscedasticity, χ, is calibrated only for the quarterly specifications, because we estimate conditional heteroscedasticity on quarterly aggregate data to have enough data points to detect possible nonlinearities.
A.2 Aggregate Data
Since they are not readily available from standard sources, we construct quarterly series of the aggregate investment rate using investment and capital data from the national account and fixed asset tables, available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 
where D Y denotes total depreciation during that year. To compute quarterly nominal capital stocks, K Q t , during the first three quarters we use the following identity: As Figure 10 shows (the vertical lines denote NBER business cycle dates), the aggregate investment rate does not appear to exhibit any trend, which is why we do not filter any statistics related to it (both for real and simulated data). 
A.3 Sectoral Data
For sectoral data the best available source is the NBER manufacturing data set, publicly available on the NBER website. It contains yearly 4-digit industry data for the manufacturing sector, 30 The maximum is achieved in 2000:II, the minimum in 1961:I.
according to the SIC-87 classification. We look at the years 1960-1996, later years are not available. We take out industry 3292, the asbestos products, because this sector essentially dies out in the nineties. This leaves us with 458 4-digit industries altogether.
Since the sectoral model analysis has to (a) be isolated from general equilibrium effects, and 
TFP-Calculation:
Since our model is about value added production as opposed to output production-we do not model utilization of materials and energy-we do not use the TFP-series in the data set, which are based on a production function for output. Rather, we use a production function for real value added in employment and real capital with payroll as a fraction of value added as the employment share, and the residual as capital share, and perform a standard Solow residual calculation for each industry separately.
Next, in order to extract the residual industry-specific and uncorrelated-with-the-aggregate component for each industry, we regress each industry time series of logged Solow residuals on the time series of the value added-weighted cross-sectional average of logged Solow residuals and a constant. Since the residuals of this regression still contain sector-specific effects, but our model features ex-ante homogenous sectors, we take out a deterministic quadratic trend on these residuals for each sector. We use a deterministic quadratic trend because it makes persistence and volatility of the estimated residuals smaller than with a linear trend or no detrending. This is a conservative approach for our purposes, as this will make, ceteris paribus, the calibrated adjustment costs and therefore aggregate nonlinearities smaller. Not detrending the sectoral Solow residuals would increase both annual persistence and the annual standard deviation of the sectoral shock innovation from 0.55 to 0.65, and from 0.0501 to 0.0518, respec-31 Aggregating to the 2-digit levels leaves us with 20 industries. 32 Indeed, using a weighted sum of 3-digit level value added deflators instead of the GDP deflator would increase the standard deviation of the sectoral shock innovation from the 0.0501 we are using to 0.0564 and the persistence of sectoral technology from 0.55 to 0.61, other things being equal. We thank Julia Thomas for this suggestion.
tively. The residuals of this trend regression are then taken as the pure sectoral Solow residual series. By construction, they are uncorrelated with the cross-sectional average series. We then estimate an AR(1)-specification for each of these series, and, to come up with a single value for σ S and ρ S , set σ S equal to the value-added-weighted average of the estimated standard deviations of the corresponding innovations, which results in σ S = 0.0501 (annual), and ρ S equal to the value-added-weighted average of the estimated first-order autocorrelation, which leads to
Since this computation is subject to substantial measurement error and somewhat arbitrary choices, we perform a number of robustness checks: 1) We fix the employment share and capital share to ν = 0.64 and θ = 0.18, as in our model parametrization for all industries. 2) Instead of using an OLS projection onto the cross-sectional mean, we simply subtract the latter. 3) We look at unweighted means. 4) We look at medians instead of means, again weighted and unweighted. The resulting numbers remain in the ballpark of the parameters we use (see Table 16 in Appendix B.4 for a robustness analysis with some of these alternative choices).
Calculation of I/K-Moments:
To extract a pure sectoral component of the time series of the industry investment rate, which like the aggregate data includes equipment and structures, we perform the same regressions that were used for TFP-calculation, except that we use a deterministic linear trend to extract sector specific effects. A quadratic detrending of the driving force and a linear detrending for the outcome variable is a conservative approach, as it will make calibrated adjustment costs and aggregate nonlinearities smaller. We do not log or filter the investment rate series. The common component we regress the sectoral investment rate series on is now a capital-weighted average of the industry investment rates. Again, we perform robustness checks with fairly stable results. The resulting standard deviation of sectoral investment rates -our target of calibration -is 0.0163.
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Data for Different Digit Levels: Finally, Table 10 provides information on the number of establishments per sector and the size of each sector within the U.S. economy for the 2-digit, 3-digit and 4-digit levels. 34 It justifies our choice to use 3-digit data in the baseline calibration.
The mean and median (across industries) number of establishments in the 3-digit industries are 2,671 and 1,147, respectively. While at the 4-digit level industries still contain a fairly large number of establishments on average, the continuum assumption is certainly more justifiable for the 3-digit level. Conversely, the across industries average fraction of industry establishments over the number of total establishments in the U.S. is 0.04% at the 3-digit level, the 33 Their persistence is 0.55. 34 We use the County Business Pattern data from 1996 to generate the numbers in this table. median 0.02% and the maximum 0.51%. In other words, the manufacturing industry with the largest number of establishments has a share of half a per cent in the total number of U.S. establishments. 35 The table thus shows that the choice of the 3-digit level is a good compromise between our two assumptions: small enough to not have general equilibrium impacts and large enough to justify the assumption of a large number of units. Nevertheless, in Appendix B.4 we report calibration results also for the 2-digit and 4-digit levels and show that our results do not hinge on this choice.
B Conditional Heteroscedasticity and Aggregate Investment
In this appendix we first present time series evidence for conditional heteroscedasticity in aggregate U.S. investment to capital ratios. Then we explain how we calibrated the maintenance parameter using this feature of the data.
B.1 Time series models
We consider two stationary time series models within the ARCH family to explore whether aggregate investment exhibits the kind of heteroscedasticity predicted by Ss-type models, namely that investment responds more to a shock during a boom than during a slump. Both models assume that
where x t ≡ I t /K t denotes the investment to capital ratio, the e t are i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance, and σ t is a simple function of recent values of x t as summarized by the index
35 These numbers would be, respectively, 0.07%, 0.03% and 9%, had we used the average fraction of industry establishments over the number of total establishments in the manufacturing sector. Had we used share in total U.S. employment as our metric, the numbers for the 3-digit sector would have been: 0.12%, 0.07% and 0.76%.
For model 1 we stipulate
while for model 2 we posit
When η 1 = η 2 = 0, the above models simplify to a standard autoregressive time series, with an impulse response that does not vary over time.
It follows from (17) that the impulse response of x to e upon impact at time t , denoted by IRF 0,t , is equal to σ t . Hence:
The models with lumpy adjustment developed in this paper (and earlier models such as Caballero and Engel, 1999) predict positive values for η 1 and η 2 . The reason is that, as shown in Figure 4 in the main text, in these models the cross-section of mandated investment concentrates in a region with a steeper likelihood of adjusting when recent investment has been high, which implies that investment becomes more responsive to shocks during these times.
B.2 Estimation and Results
Assume observations for x t are available for t = 1, ..., T , and denote by p max and k max the largest values considered for p and k in (17) and (18), respectively. For all pairs (p, k) with p ≤ p max and k ≤ k max we estimate an AR(p) using OLS, and then use the residuals from this regression, denoted t , to estimate α and η via OLS from:
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Model 1:
We choose the optimal values for p and k, denoted by p * and k * , using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 36 The first equation is based on
while the second equation comes from E[ Table 11 presents the estimates obtained for both models, for U.S. private, fixed, nonresidential investment, and for equipment and structures separately. The frequency is quarterly, from 1960:I to 2005:IV. We use p max = k max = 12.
The first and second rows report the optimal values for p and k. The following seven rows report statistics related to the magnitude and significance of the parameter that captures heteroscedasticity and time-variation in impulse responses, η. The third row has the point estimate for η and the fourth row the corresponding t -statistic, obtained from OLS estimates for (21) . The latter may overstate the significance of η, since it ignores variations in the first stage regressions that determine the autoregressive order, p * . For this reason we use 10,000 bootstrap simulations for the investment rate series, starting from our estimates for the e t s in (17) and (18), to provide an alternative measure of the precision of our estimates for η. 37 The fifth row presents the p-values we obtain for η > 0 via bootstrap simulations, we report one-sided p-values since
Ss-type models predict η > 0. The last 4 rows present measures for the range of values taken by the estimated impulse response upon impact: σ max , and σ min denote the largest and smallest heteroscedasticity estimates over the sample considered (172 observations), σ p the p-th percentile. We sign the range estimates by the estimated sign of η. Table 11 shows that nonresidential investment exhibits significant (both statistically and economically) heteroscedasticity for both models. This is also the case for structures, and for equipment under Model 1. The range of heteroscedasticity values implied by the estimated models is large. For example, the estimates for model 2 imply that the 95th percentile is 61.9%
larger (e 0.4816
1.619) than the 5th percentile. 37 For each series generated via bootstrap we estimate the p max × k max models and determine the optimal values for p, k and, most important, η. Table 12 shows the estimates we obtain when applying the methodology described above to the cyclical component of log-GDP. We consider the three most commonly used filters to detrend GDP: the HP-1600 filter, the Baxter-King's bandpass filter and first-differences. By contrast with investment rates, there is no evidence of the heteroscedastic behavior predicted by
Ss-type models for GDP, in fact, in 3 out of 6 cases considered the estimated value for η has the wrong sign. This suggests that it is not the shocks, which presumably affect both investment and GDP, that drive our heteroscedasticity findings for investment, but the mechanism that transmits these shocks into aggregate investment. The time series models (19) and (20) provide simple and robust approaches to test for the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity. More sophisticated options can be used as well. For example, instead of assuming the parametric relationships in (19) and (20), we could allow for a more general expression of the form σ t = h(x k t −1 ), where h is estimated non-parametrically. Figure 1 in the introduction plots the estimate we obtain for h (normalized by the average fitted value for σ t ) using p = k = 6, a Gaussian kernel, and cross-validation to determine the appropriate bandwidth.
B.3 Calibrating the Maintenance Parameter
To choose parameter values that match the heteroscedasticity present in aggregate U.S. investment, it is useful to summarize the estimated conditional heteroscedasticity schedules (19) and (20) by one statistic. We do this via the signed log-ratio of the 95th and 5th percentile of the fitted values for σ. Our calibration strategy is akin to the indirect inference approach proposed by Smith (1993) , since we match a time-series moment informed by our DSGE model. We work with model 2 and consider p = 1, because the shocks in the DSGE model are AR(1), and k = 1. This is the time series model in Figures 2 and 3 . Table 13 reports estimates of the heteroscedasticity statistic for the frictionless model and the models we considered when calibrating the maintenance parameter χ. The first column reports the value for the range statistic in the actual U.S. investment series. The second column reports the value for a model where capital can be adjusted at no cost ('frictionless model').
Columns 3 through 9 consider various values for the maintenance parameter. In each case the simulated model matches the volatility of sectoral and aggregate investment. For each value of χ we generated a large number of time series of aggregate investment to capital ratios of the same length as the U.S. investment series in our data. We then estimated the range statistic for these series - Table 13 reports the average values.
It follows from the first row of Table 13 that our models with lumpy adjustment match the conditional heteroscedasticity in the actual data much better than a frictionless model. It also follows from the first row that a maintenance parameter of 0.50 generates a first moment of 0.3021 for the range statistic, which is close to the estimated value of 0.2901. We therefore choose χ = 0.50 for our DSGE model with lumpy capital adjustment. 
B.4 Robustness
This section addresses various issues related to the robustness of our calibration. First we show that using alternative moments to summarize the range of heteroscedasticity values does not affect our findings. Second, we show that had we used model 1 instead of model 2 would have biased our results slightly against finding large conditional heteroscedasticity in the data. Third, we show that our sectoral calibration choices do not drive the results. Specifically, we study robustness to using 2-digit and 4-digit data to compute the statistics for the sectoral Solow residuals and the investment rates we use. Fourth, we also discuss robustness to how we detrend sectoral data. We show that using a weighted median as opposed to a weighted average to aggregate sectoral moments leaves the results unaltered. And finally, we experiment with the choice for the total annual standard deviation production units face, studying cases with 0.075 and 0.15, compared to our baseline choice of 0.10. Table 14 shows the implied values for χ for alternative definitions for the heteroscedastic-ity range (log-ratio for 90th and 10th percentile, and log-ratio for largest and smallest values over the 184 quarters considered). It shows that χ = 0.50 slightly overestimates the volatility of the responsiveness index, if we use the ratio of the maximum to minimum index -the 50% mentioned in the introduction and slightly underestimates it, had we use the ratio of the 90 percentile to the 10 percentile. But clearly, all calibration targets are close, whereas the frictionless and Khan-Thomas models cannot match conditional heteroscedasticity independently of how it is defined. Table 15 shows that had we used Model 1 in the conditional heteroscedasticity regression, we would have found a slightly stronger variation of the responsiveness index in the data, by 50% (e 0.3964
1.49), and, consequently, the calibrated maintenance parameter would have been higher.
We now go back to the calibration based on Model 2 and check robustness to the choices we made in obtaining the sectoral statistics we use in the calibration. Table 16 shows that our baseline calibrated value for the maintenance parameter, χ = 0.5, is robust to these choices.
Also, in any of these cases the frictionless model features a heteroscedasticity range around 0.05, well below the data's 0.3021. 
C Numerical Appendix
In this appendix, we describe in detail the numerical implementation of the model computation. Unless otherwise stated, the numerical specifications refer to the baseline calibration in the main text, although most of them are common across all models.
C.1 Decision Problem
Given the assumptions we made in the main paper: 1) ρ S = ρ I = ρ, and 2) approximating the distribution µ by the aggregate capital stock,k, the dynamic programming problem has a 4-dimensional state space: (k,k, z, ). Since the employment problem has an analytical solution, there is essentially just one continuous control, k .
We note that for all partial equilibrium computations the dimension of the state space collapses to three,k is no longer needed to compute prices and aggregate movements. Instead, we follow KT in fixing the intertemporal price and the real wage at their average levels from the general equilibrium simulations.
Since we allow for a continuous control, k, andk and z can take on any value continuously, we can only compute the value function exactly at the grid points above and interpolate for in-between values. This is done by using a multidimensional cubic splines procedure, with a so-called "not-a-knot"-condition to address the large number of degrees of freedom problem, when using splines (see Judd, 1998) . We compute the solution by value function iteration, using 20 steps of policy improvement after each actual optimization procedure. The optimum is found by using a golden section search. Upon convergence, we check single-peakedness of the objective function, to guarantee that the golden section search is reasonable. 
C.2 Equilibrium Simulation
For the calibration of the general equilibrium models we draw one random series for the aggregate technology level and fix it across models. We use T = 600 and discard the first 100 observations. For computing the conditional heteroscedasticity in the model simulations we use a much longer simulation horizon of T = 10000. We find that, generally, the statistics are robust to T . We start from an arbitrary individual capital distribution and the stationary distribution for the combined productivity level. The model economies typically settle fast into their stochastic steady state after roughly 50 observations. Since with idiosyncratic shocks, adjustment costs and necessary maintenance some production unit may not adjust for a very long time, we take out any individual capital stock in the distribution that has a marginal weight below 10 −10 , in order to save on memory. We re-scale the remaining distribution proportionally.
As in the production unit's decision problem, we use a golden section search to find the optimal target capital level, given p. We find the market clearing intertemporal price, using a combination of bisection, secant and inverse quadratic interpolation methods. Precision of the market-clearing outcome is better than 10 −7 .
To further assess the quality of the assumed log-linear equilibrium rules, we perform the following simulation: for each point in the T = 500 (we discard the first 100 observations) time series, we iterate for a time series ofT = 100 aggregate capital and the intertemporal price forward, using only the equilibrium rules and assuming the actual time path for aggregate technology. We then compare the aggregate capital and p afterT steps with the actually simulated ones, when the equilibrium price was updated at each step. We then compute maximum absolute percentage deviations, mean squared percentage deviations, and the correlation between the simulated values and the out-of-sample forecasts. Tables 17 and 18 summarize the numer- ical results for each model. The rows contain: the coefficients of the log-linear regression, its R 2 and standard error and the three above measures that assess the out-of-sample quality of the equilibrium rules. They assess the log-linear approximation for future capital and current p, respectively. Baseline-SKEW refers to our baseline calibration, where agents use additionally the log standard deviation and skewness of the capital distribution for forecasting. Table 17 shows that there exists a good log-linear approximation for aggregate capital as a function of last period's capital and the current aggregate shock. This may seem surprising in light of the time-varying impulse response functions we described in the main text. However, the numbers also show that in particular out-of-sample forecasts improve, when higher moments of the capital distribution are introduced. Furthermore, as we argue next, the goodnessof-fit for an equation analogous to (11a) and (11b), but with the aggregate investment rate as the dependent variable, is worse, even though the poorer fit has no bearing on aggregate investment dynamics. We simulated a series of 500 observations for our baseline model, assuming that agents use the first, the first two and the first three moments of capital in their forecasting rules. 38 We divided the simulated series into quartiles based on the magnitude of the actual investment rate, and calculated, for each quartile, the R 2 -goodness-of-fit statistic between the aggregate investment rate series implied by the forecasting rule and the "true"aggregate investment rate series, which we assume to be the one generated, when agents use three moments of the capital distribution for forecasting. Table 19 shows our results. The average (across quartiles) R 2 between the log-linear approximation and the true investment rate is only 0.85 for the baseline model. This average increases to 0.99 (0.97) when the log-standard-deviation of capital is added as a regressor, and to well above 0.99 when the skewness statistic is included as well. 39 The last two columns of Table 19 show that the estimated first and second order autocorrelations of the investment rate also improve significantly when using higher moments in the forecasting rules: the corresponding values for the actual investment rate series are 0.919 and 0.842, respectively, for the baseline calibration.
However, we also recomputed the evolution of the aggregate investment rate, when agents use the rules that include higher moments of capital, and found no discernible differences with what we obtained with the log-linear forecasting rules: the correlation coefficient between the sample paths of I /K generated with forecasting rules with and without higher moments is above 0.9999.
C.3 Sectoral Simulation
Underlying the sectoral simulation are four assumptions: First, we assume a large enough number of sectors. Second, we assume a large σ S /si g ma A ratio, so that we can compute the sectoral implications of our model independently of the aggregate general equilibrium calculations. This is also reflected in our treatment of the sectoral data as residual values, which are uncorrelated with aggregate components. Third, we make use of the assumption that a sector is large enough to use a law of large numbers for the true idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
Fourth, we assume that ρ S = ρ I , and that sectoral and idiosyncratic productivity shocks are independent, so that we can treat sectoral and idiosyncratic uncertainty as one state variable in the general equilibrium problem.
We start by fixing the aggregate technology level at its average level: z SS = 1. The converged equilibrium law of motion for aggregate capital can then be used to compute the steady state 38 More precisely, the first case has the log-mean of capital holdings as a regressor, the second case adds the log-standard deviation and the third case also incorporates the skewness of capital holdings. Of course, log z t is a regressor in all cases. 39 For the frictionless model the first part of the first row would read: 0.9981, 0.9887, 0.9774, 0.9796, 0.9841, 0.9825.
And the autocorrelations for forecasted investment rates are almost identical to the ones for the actual series.
aggregate capital level that belongs to this aggregate productivity. It is the fixed point of the aggregate law of motion, evaluated at z SS :
This, in turn, leads to the steady state p SS ≡ exp(a p + b p log(k SS )).
Then we specify a separate grid for idiosyncratic and sectoral productivity in such a way that all new grid points and any product of them will lie on the original 19-state grid for the combined productivity, used in the general equilibrium problem. Given the equi-spaced (in logs)
nature of the combined grid this is obviously possible. Thus, the idiosyncratic grid comprises 11 grid points, and the sectoral grid 9 grid points, both equi-spaced and centered around unity.
Next, we recompute optimal target capital levels as well as gross values of investment (see equation 12d) at z SS ,k SS , at the 19 values for . By construction, these are then also the values for any ( S , I )-combination. Note that we use the value functions computed from the general equilibrium case. We draw a random series of T = 2600 for S , which remains fixed across all models, start from an arbitrary capital distribution and the stationary distribution for the idiosyncratic technology level, and follow the behavior of this representative sector, using the sectoral policy rules. The details are similar to those of the equilibrium simulation.
Finally, we test the two main assumptions on which we base our sectoral computations: a continuum of sectors and fixing the aggregate environment at its steady state level. To this end, we compute the equilibrium with a finite number of sectors, N S . Also, we introduce an additional state-variable, given by:¯ S,t ≡ i =1,...,N S log( S,t (i )), which captures changes in the aggregate environment, beyond the common aggregate shock. Obviously,¯ S,t = 0, ∀ t , as N S → ∞, by the law of large numbers and assuming sectoral independence. This additional aggregate state is then integrated over by Gauss-Hermitian integration, which is facilitated by the fact that the¯ S,t -process is independent of the aggregate technology process (by assumption). For computational reasons -following a large number of sectors with a large number of production units each is considerably more onerous in a quarterly calibration than in a yearly calibration -, we run these robustness checks for the annual equivalents of our baseline models.
We choose two different values for N S . First, 400, which roughly equals the number of 3-digit SIC-87 sectors in the U.S. (395). Since, however, sectors are of very different size and overall importance, and also often correlated, we decrease, secondly, N S to 100 for robustness reasons.
The resulting residual σ¯ S is 0.0026 and 0.0052, respectively. Notice that in both cases σ¯ S is considerably smaller than σ A = 0.0120, the σ A for the annual frictionless calibration, so that we should not expect too large an effect from this additional source of aggregate uncertainty.
The following table shows the aggregate and sectoral standard deviations for annual invest- 
D Matching Establishment Statistics
One argument we gave for using sectoral rather than plant level data to calibrate micro frictions is that matching micro moments may not be a robust way of pinning down microeconomic parameters when the goal is to use these parameters to identify aggregate effects of the mechanism. In this appendix we provide support to this claim by showing that a straightforward modification of the micro underpinnings of our baseline model leads to a satisfactory match of establishment level moments. More important, the match of sectoral and aggregate moments we obtained in the main text is unaffected by this extension. Our objective here is not to add realism to our original model, but to illustrate the potential lack of power of using (only) plant level data for our purpose.
D.1 A Simple Extension
A first choice we need to make when matching the model to micro data is how many micro units in the model correspond to one establishment. Choices by other authors have covered a wide range, going from one to a a continuum (see footnote 15).
Two additional issues arise if we choose to model an establishment as the aggregation of many micro units. First, we must address the extent to which shocks-both to productivity and to adjustment costs-are correlated across units within an establishment. 40 Second, we must take a stance on the fact that establishments sell off and buy what in our model corresponds to one or more micro units.
Next we present a simple model that incorporates both elements mentioned above. The , since all we do in this extension is group micro units into "establishments" in a way that has no implication for sectoral aggregates. We consider the polar cases with uncorrelated productivity shocks (σ Regarding the sale and purchase of micro units, we assume that in every period the capi- 40 For tractability, we assume that decisions are made at the micro-unit level, not the establishment level. 41 x t ∼ AR(1; ρ, σ) means that the process x t follows an AR(1) with first order autocorrelation ρ and standard deviation of innovations equal to σ. 42 There is a one-to-one match between micro units in the model and establishment level data when adjustment costs and productivity shocks are perfectly correlated. Otherwise a continuum of model micro units correspond to one establishment in the data.
tal stock that is recorded at the establishment level is related to the capital stock for that unit determined by our baseline model via
where the superscripts r and m stand for "recorded" and "model". The τ's are i.i.d. draws from a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation σ τ .
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The capital accumulation identity for recorded investment and (22) 
It follows that if the establishment sells off a fraction of the units it holds in t + 1, these sales will show up as lower (or even negative) investment in the recorded investment data.
Dividing both sides of (23) by K r est , using (22) and denoting investment rates I t /K t by i t yields 
with ∆τ es,t +1 ≡ τ es,t +1 − τ est .
Summing up, our (admittedly simple) extension introduces three parameters -the degree of correlation of productivity and adjustment costs across units within establishments, and the volatility parameter for unit purchases and sales-that can be used to fit establishment level moments without affecting the match of sectoral and aggregate statistics.
D.2 Matching Establishment Level Statistics
For the four combinations of correlation across both sources of shocks we generate a histogram with 2,500 realizations of establishment level I /K using our model.
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Denote by f i , i = 1, ..., 5 the fraction of LRD establishments that adjusted less than −20%, between −20 and −1%, between −1% and 1%, between 1 and 20% and above 20%, respec- 43 We choose a symmetric distribution so that asymmetries in the histogram of investment rates cannot be attributed to this choice. 44 We compute these investment rates using the approximation described in Appendix C.3 with σ tively. And denote by π i (σ τ ) the fraction of units with adjustment in the previous bins after applying the transformation described in (24). We choose the value of σ τ that minimizes i | f i − π i (σ τ )|/ f i , that is, that minimizes the average absolute deviation. 
